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A WORD FOR THE COMMON GOOD
THOMA S L. SIHAFER*

If any value is worth holding without examination, I suppose it is the
value of relationship-what the trendy would call dialogue, and what the
traditional and academic would call, as Professor Burt does, argument. In
the way he writes of it, it is a democratic value: The state rests on conversation. That is not far from Aristotle's saying that the state rests on friendship,
and relating his argument to Aristotle's may be useful because Burt's subject
faces an issue Aristotle did not face: Who is admitted to the conversation?
If Burt's point were seen as resting on people in relationship with one
another, two at a time, there might be an examination of it that would lie
deeper than politics; one might then say, with Martin Buber' and, say, H.R.
Niebuhr, 2 that the other, the one I can come to call "thou," is the means
for discovery both of morals and of being. Maybe Burt doesn't need to go
that deep, but I think he needs to say why it is that argument is important,
morally important:
Consider two people waiting at a bus stop. The first principle (the
unexamined principle) in Burt's argument is that they should talk to one
another and that those who influence them should help them to talk to one
another. Is that because it is a good thing for any two people who are
together to talk to one another? Maybe so; but I can imagine that one of
them is waiting for the bus north and the other for the bus south. I can
imagine that it might seem appropriate to their friends, north and south, for
them not to talk to one another. To argue that they should not be separate
is to claim something in common for them-a community, a morality, an
existence, or something else. If they are, in their separateness, not treating
one another as people should treat one another-if I (you) say that-then
isn't a claim made, a claim about each of them, that is not evident from the
situation?3
There is an ethnic implicit in Burt's argument for argument, and it could,
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1. See M. BUBER, I AND THOU (W. Kaufmann trans. 1972).
2. See H. R. NmBaRn, THE REsPONSMILE SEm' (1963) (Harper and Row ed. 1978); T.
Shaffer, MoralImplications and Effects of Legal Education, or: Brother JustinianGoes to Law
School, 34 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 190, 201 (1984).
3. Buber's argument is ontological-I don't even come to be until there is, for me, a
thou. He was not talking about "Some Enchanted Evening," though he sometimes said a bus
stop would do. See M. BUBER, BETWEEiN MAN AND MAN 5 (R.G. Smith trans. 1947); M. BUBER,
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at 67.
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usefully, be explicated. There may be more to it than good commentary on
two moments in the melancholy story of a fractious and pretentious political
authority in North America.
Burt does rest some or all of his argument on an intuitive commitment
to equality. That may be enough, but I think the argument could rest on
something deeper. Something deeper than, say, Locke and Jefferson and the
French Revolution. 4 Relationship, culture, and virtue mean more in this
admirable thesis than equality does. Buber, Moses, and Aristotle, with
notions of common good, are in there somewhere.

4. S. HAUERWAS, A CommuNrry OF CHARACTER (1981); R. RODES, THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE
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BARTH, ETHIcs 385 (1928-29) (G. Bromiley trans. 1981).

